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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

The question of the year in which a loss is sustained on sale or disposal of
capital assets, on bad debts, etc. is one that causes a great deal of controversy
between taxpayers and the commissioner.
A taxpayer may have intimate knowledge that a loss has been sustained in a
certain accounting year and may charge off the loss in that year, but make
additional efforts thereafter to forestall the loss. In such cases it is the almost
invariable practice of the commissioner to disallow the deduction for loss and to
place upon the taxpayer the burden of proving the validity of his contention.
This is no light burden, for it is difficult to prove in later years that all the at
tendant circumstances surrounding the subject upon which the loss is deter
mined tended to show clearly that the account or property was worthless in the
year in which the deduction from gross income was made.
A decision of the United States circuit court of appeals, fourth circuit, in the
case of Wheeling Tile Company, throws light on the subject and will serve as a
precedent in such instances.
It appears that this taxpayer in 1920 was using gas as a fuel and was expe
riencing difficulty with its gas supply. With the intention of finding a satisfac
tory substitute for gas, it expended $19,275.68 in the purchase of an oil-burning
system. This system was found to be unsatisfactory in that year and though
attempts were made in subsequent years to remedy the defective system, the
taxpayer charged off the $19,275.68, less a salvage value of $3,000, as a loss
sustained in 1920.
Because of these later experiments the commissioner disallowed the deduction
from the 1920 income, claiming, apparently, that the loss was not sustained
until a subsequent year. The board of tax appeals sustained the commissioner
but the circuit court of appeals held with the taxpayer that the loss was sus
tained in the year in which the taxpayer made the deduction, i.e., in 1920.
The court is of the opinion that the case is analogous to a deduction for worth
less debts which to be allowable as a deduction “ must be charged off in the year
they are ascertained to be worthless.” In determining that the property was
worthless the court seemed to rely on the precedent established in the case of
S. S. White Dental Manufacturing Company, in which it was held that:
“A loss may become complete enough for deduction without the tax
payer establishing that there is no possibility of eventual recoupment.
. . . The taxing act does not require the taxpayer to be an incorrigible
optimist.”

The court in the instant case found the evidence to indicate that all the at
tendant circumstances surrounding this taxpayer’s deduction in 1920 tended
to justify him in his opinion that the oil-burning system was worthless in the
year 1920.
The phrase used by the court in the White Dental case—“The taxing act
does not require the taxpayer to be an incorrigible optimist”—touches a re
sponsive chord in the breast of the present writer. It is one of those phrases
which state in a few words an idea which remains in the mind. Every tax ac
countant has met situations wherein it is necessary to show that not to take a
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loss when there is every reason to believe it has been sustained would display
lack of comprehensive judgment.
In cases of bad-debt deductions especially controversy usually arises, and the
court’s language will be a potent precedent to cite in such arguments.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Interest upon an amount refunded in 1923 was allowed even though no
formal claim for refund had been filed. Under section 1324 (a) of the 1921 act,
which, under the decision of the United States supreme court in re Magnolia
Petroleum Company is applicable providing for payment of interest upon the
allowance of a claim for refund, a letter, containing all the essential information
required to be set out in the official forms is sufficient. (U. S. court of claims,
Georgeine D. Lasher v. United States.)
An individual engaged in business as a drug broker and in the business of
buying and selling drugs on his own account is taxable under section 209, act of
1917, on income derived from the drug brokerage business having a nominal
invested capital, at the flat 8% rate, where the books were so kept as to enable
an accurate allocation of the total income of the business. (U. S. court of
claims, Charles J. Huisking v. United States.)
A transfer of property by decedent to her two children was not intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, and was a bonafide sale for a fair consideration, within section 402 (c) of the 1918 act, where, in
consideration of the transfer, the children agreed to pay her $6,000 per annum
during her life time as well as taxes and insurance on her property during her
life, and to hold as their joint and undivided property during her life time the
estate of their deceased father, one third of which constituted the subject
matter of the transfer. (U. S. court of claims, Charles K. Lincoln, adminis
trator v. United States.)
Dividends declared and paid during 1917 are taxable at 1917 rates to the
extent that the distributing corporation had profits which were earned during
the period from January 1, 1917, to the date of payment of the dividends, and
not to the date of the declaration thereof. (U. S. court of claims, J. K. Paste
v. United States.)
A life tenant is taxable upon the income received from a testamentary trust
without deduction for exhaustion of the corpus of the trust. (Court of appeals
of District of Columbia, Marguerite T. Whitcomb v. David H. Blair, commis
sioner.)
A decision of the board of tax appeals based upon the testimony taken at
the trial on an issue of fact should not be reversed by an appellate court because
of a difference of opinion as to the mere weight of the evidence. (Court of
appeals of District of Columbia, W. K. Henderson Iron Works & Supply Co. v.
David H. Blair, commissioner.)
A contingent bequest to charity, the actual present value of which can not
be determined from any known data, is not deductible, under section 403 (a)
(3) act of 1918, in determining the net estate subject to the estate tax. (U. S.
supreme court, John J. Mitchell et. al. v. United States.)
A loss on a sale of property occupied as a residence until October 1, 1901, but
abandoned as a residence in that year and rented until the date of sale in 1920,
is deductible, the basis of such loss being the value when rented in 1901 or March
1, 1913, value, whichever is less. (U. S. supreme court, D. B. Heiner, collector,
v. James R. Tindle et. al., executors.)
Rights acquired under a written agreement, whereby the taxpayer acquired
the exclusive right for a term of 99 years to sell merchandise and supplies upon
certain property of a company engaged in mining coal, together with the right
to select and occupy such grounds as the taxpayer might require for carrying on
such business, constitute tangible property within the meaning of section 325,
act of 1918. (U. S. district court, New Mexico, United States v. Blossburg
Mercantile Company.)
A corporation was held not to be carrying on or doing business, and, therefore,
not subject to the capital-stock tax under the 1918 act, where, during the period
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in question, it was engaged in disposing of its assets and liquidating. (U. S.
court of claims, Union Land and Timber Company v. United States.)
Loss sustained in 1920 from the installation of an oil-burning plant or system,
which was tried out and found to be unsatisfactory within that year, is deducti
ble in the difference between cost and the salvage value thereof, the fact that
further experiments were afterward made with a view of making the oil system
effective not proving that the expenditure was a complete loss in the year made.
(U. S. circuit court of appeals, fourth circuit, Wheeling Tile Company v. Com
missioner.)
An injunction was denied to restrain the collection of a tax assessed for the
fiscal year 1919 within the statutory period applicable thereto, where collection
was claimed to be barred by the statute of limitations provided in section 250
(d) act of 1921, and the liability therefor extinguished under section 1106 (a)
act of 1926, the court holding that section 3224, Revised Statutes, forbids a suit
to restrain the collection of the tax, and the taxpayer has an adequate remedy
at law. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, second circuit, The Ellay Company v.
Bowers, collector.)
Collection by a suit brought more than six years after assessment, against
the transferees of corporate assets, of a tax for part of the calendar year 1917
assessed in January, 1920, within the statutory period applicable thereto
against a dissolved corporation upon the basis of a revenue agent’s report
held barred by the statute of limitations. (U. S. district court, Nebraska,
Omaha division, United States v. Nelson D. Updike et. al.)
The United States circuit court of appeals has no jurisdiction to review a de
cision of the board of tax appeals where hearings were had and briefs filed prior
to the effective date of the 1926 act. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, second
circuit, David H. Blair, commissioner, v. Harmon W. Hendricks.)
Carrying charges of taxes, interest and other expenses paid prior to March 1,
1913, on property acquired prior thereto may not be capitalized in ascertain
ing the cost of the property sold in 1920, in determining the basis for ascertain
ing gain or loss upon sale thereof. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, second circuit,
Arthur C. Fraser v. Commissioner.)
A deduction was allowed in 1918 of the amount of a judgment rendered in
that year against a taxpayer on the accrual basis, paid in 1920 when the judg
ment was affirmed, where, upon appeal from the judgment, United States bonds
in excess of the amount of the judgment were deposited with the trustee as
security pending the outcome of the appeal. (U. S. court of claims, Malleable
Iron Range Company v. United States.)
An agreement under which a corporation sold its assets in 1919 to an individ
ual at a specified sum and the stockholders sold their stock in the corporation at
a specified sum to the same individual was held to be a sale of the assets of the
corporation, the sale of the stock being fictitious and amounting to no more than
an agreement to dissolve the corporation, and the corporate funds distributed
to the stockholders are chargeable with taxes for 1919 assessed against the
dissolved corporation. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, second circuit, United
States v. Louis Klausner and Edmund Fain.)
Compensation in 1918 and 1921, inclusive, by a taxpayer commissioned as
surgeon general of the United States in charge of public-health service and later
as assistant surgeon general assigned to special duties in the United States and
in foreign countries is not exempt under section 213 (b) (8) act of 1918, where
not in the “active service” of either the army or the navy, since he was not de
tailed to the military services, was not subject to the orders of the military
authorities, and received his compensation from the treasury department.
(U. S. court of claims, Rupert Blue v. United States.)
Loss from damage to trees in residence grounds caused by an ice storm in
1921 was allowed as a deduction in that year upon the testimony of competent
witnesses as to the amount of damage sustained. (U. S. district court, Massa
chusetts, Sherman L. Whipple v. United States.)
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